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The Biased Competition Model (BCM) suggests both top-down and bottom-up biases 
operate on selective attention (e.g. Desimone & Duncan, 1995). It has been suggested 
that top-down control signals may arise from working memory. In support, Downing 
(2000) found faster responses to probes presented in the location of stimuli held vs. 
not held in working memory. Soto, Heinke, Humphreys, and Blanco (2005) showed 
the involuntary nature of this effect and that shared features between stimuli were 
sufficient to attract attention. Here we show that stimuli held in working memory had 
an influence on the deployment of attentional resources even when: (i) it was 
detrimental to the task, (ii) there was equal prior exposure, (iii) there was no bottom-
up priming. These results provide further support for involuntary top-down guidance 
of attention from working memory and the basic tenets of the BCM, but further 












A generally accepted function of selective attention is that it governs the information 
that enters memory stores. More recently, it has been suggested that information held 
in memory may also influence the deployment of selective attention (i.e. a link in the 
opposite direction; see Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Awh, Vogel and Oh, 2006). The 
Biased Competition Model (BCM) suggests that both top-down and bottom-up biases 
operate on selective attention (e.g. Desimone & Duncan, 1995) and it has been 
suggested that top-down control signals may arise from working memory. 
 
de Fockert, Rees, Frith and Lavie (2001) found that a heavy working memory load in 
a famous-name classification task resulted in less selective modes of attention, so that 
distractor stimuli (faces presented in the background) were more likely to be 
processed. Further evidence for working memory influencing attention comes from 
Awh, Jonides, and Reuter-Lorenz (1998), who found increased visual processing 
efficiency for spatial locations held in working memory. Participants made forced-
choice classification judgements to stimuli presented in a remembered vs. a non-
remembered location. Reaction times (RT) were quicker for stimuli presented in the 
remembered location. In addition, Pashler and Shiu (1999) had participants observe a 
rapid stream of visual stimuli, in order to detect a digit. They found that participants 
suffered from an attentional blink effect (and therefore missed the digit) following the 
appearance of a previously visualised object in the stream of visual stimuli. These 
results imply that information held in working memory influences the deployment of 
attentional resources.  
 
More recently, Soto, Heinke, Humphreys, and Blanco (2005) showed that an item in a 
visual display that shared features (e.g. colour) with an item held in working memory 
could also attract attention in multiple item displays. This was the case even if doing 
so was detrimental to search performance because the memorised item in the display 
never contained the search target. Priming the item alone (with no memory 
requirement) did not have the same effect. Soto, Humphreys and Heinke (2006) 
showed that such effects of working memory persisted even in the presence of pop-
out search targets. Further work by Soto and Humphreys (2006) investigated the 
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working memory effect in patients with visual extinction. They found that extinction 
of contralesional targets was reduced when they matched the object held in working 
memory. Bottom-up priming from the presentation of the object cue was not enough 
to improve awareness, even when the cue was processed until the level of 
identification. Together, these studies show that attention can be inadvertently and 
involuntarily allocated to task performance based on both the representational 
characteristics of objects and spatial locations stored in working memory. 
 
Downing (2000) performed a series of studies in order to investigate the relationship 
between working memory and attention.  He reasoned that if the biased competition 
model is correct, stimuli in working memory should bias the competition amongst 
visual stimuli in a scene even if there is no visual search task (cf. Soto et al, 2005 who 
used a visual search task). He presented a cue stimulus to remember, followed by two 
further prime stimuli to the left and right of fixation (for which no action on behalf of 
the participant was required) and then a probe in the location of one of the previous 
prime stimuli to which participants made a speeded orientation decision. Participants 
were then presented with a memory test stimulus and they had to indicate whether or 
not it was the same as the cue stimulus. The crucial manipulation was that one of the 
prime stimuli presented matched the initial cue stimulus, whereas the other was a 
novel stimulus. Downing found that when the probe stimulus was presented in the 
location of the matching prime stimulus, it was responded to significantly faster than 
when it was presented in the location of the neutral (mismatching) stimulus. 
 
Downing (2000) dismissed the possibility of his effect being one of strategy 
(attending to the matching stimulus to aid with the memory task) on the basis of: (i) 
time being too short; and (ii) the minimal demands actually required by the task. He 
also investigated one possible role of strategy in his fourth experiment. He reasoned 
that in his previous experiments, participants may have inadvertently been performing 
the memory task (final task) on the prime stimuli, thereby drawing their attention 
towards matching stimuli. By removing the matching judgement from the final task, 
he found no evidence to suggest that this was the case. However, there is an 
alternative strategy based explanation that Downing (2000) did not consider. 
Chapman (1967) demonstrated the phenomenon called illusory correlation 
(overestimating the degree of correlation, or seeing one where none exists), by 
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showing that students overestimated the occurrence of meaningful vs. non-meaningful 
pairs of words. It can therefore be speculated that Downing’s participants perceived 
an illusory correlation between the matching prime stimulus and the number of times 
the probe was presented on it and (albeit inadvertently) directed their attention 
accordingly (but see also Soto et al, 2005). Within Downing’s paradigm, such illusory 
correlations would tend to be perpetuated since attention would be further directed to 
them, thereby enabling participants to see the probe in the location of the matching 
prime stimulus within the 147ms before it disappeared. In other words, if people had 
the perception that a cue would most often appear on a stimulus also held in working 
memory, then they might direct their attention towards that stimulus and actually see 
the cue on that stimulus more often than on the other stimulus.  
 
In his third experiment, Downing (2000) investigated the possibility of the effect 
essentially being one of feed-forward priming, rather than top-down priming from the 
active maintenance of information in working memory per se. In this experiment, half 
the participants performed the memory task at the end of each trial as before, whereas 
the other half were presented with the same stimuli but were asked to make only an 
immediate size judgement on the cue stimulus (therefore requiring no memory). 
Whereas the memory task produced results equivalent to those already discussed, the 
size task actually produced the opposite pattern of results. Responses to probes placed 
in the position of matching stimuli were responded to more slowly than those placed 
on mismatching stimuli. This result was interpreted as evidence that mere exposure to 
the cue shape is not enough to direct attention toward matching objects and it was 
proposed that the reverse pattern may have been found due to weaker neuronal 
responses to repetitions of stimuli (Miller and Desimone, 1994).  
 
The argument that feed-forward priming of stimuli can attract attention to them is 
clearly in contrast to that of Downing’s (2000) proposals of weaker responses (and 
rejection of attention) to repetitions of stimuli unless they are held in working 
memory. The experiments presented here therefore aimed to further investigate: (i) 
the role of strategy in the attraction of attention by items in working memory, (ii) 
whether bottom-up visual priming is sufficient to attract attention without a stimulus 
being in working memory or whether instead attention is actually more likely to be 
directed to the neutral stimulus in these circumstances (iii) whether holding an item in 
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working memory is sufficient to attract attention without a stimulus being bottom-up 
primed beforehand by a visual representation of it.  
 
Experiment 1: A probability manipulation 
 
Experiment 1 investigated the potential role of strategy in paying attention to the 
stimulus matching the cue using an adaptation of Downing’s (2000) paradigm. In 
order to avoid participants perceiving a positive relationship (illusory correlation) 
between the matching stimulus and the location of the probe, in this experiment the 
probability of the cue being in the location of the matching stimulus was reduced from 
50% to 20%, thus actively discouraging any strategy to attend to it (see also Soto et al, 
2005).  
Participants 
18 participants (2 males) volunteered from the 1st year undergraduate psychology 
students at Aston University in order to earn research credits as part of a course 
requirement. The mean age of participants was 20.78 (range:18-36). Participants were 
naïve as to the purpose of the experiment. 
 
Design and Procedure 
The experiment was programmed using E prime v1.0 and was similar to Downing’s 
(2000) first experiment. An example of the procedure is illustrated in Figure 1. On 
each trial, a stimulus to be remembered (a photo of an everyday object) was presented 
(the “cue” stimulus: 1506ms), followed by a fixation point (1506ms) and a display 
containing two “prime” stimuli to the left and to the right of the fixation point 
(187ms). One of the two prime stimuli presented in the array was a “matching” 
stimulus; the other was a novel stimulus. Matching stimuli would appear on the left or 
the right side randomly. Participants were instructed that the two pictures presented as 
primes had nothing to do with their task The same display was then re-displayed 
containing a “u” or “n” shaped probe (randomly determined with equal frequency) in 
the centre of one of the stimuli (146ms) and then a further fixation point until 
response. Participants were asked to respond as quickly and accurately as possible to 
the probe, using the k (for u) and m (for n) keys with their right hand. Although the 
probability of the probe appearing on either side of the display was 50%, the 
probability of it appearing on the matched item was decreased to 20%. Participants 
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were then presented with a further “memory” stimulus and asked to make a judgment, 
about whether or not it was the same as the cue stimulus (v for yes, c for no), with 
their left hand. The memory stimulus presented as the final memory task either 
matched the cue stimulus or was novel (with equal probability). The independent 
variable in this experiment was therefore the match condition (match or mismatch). 10 
trials were run as a practice and then 12 blocks of 10 trials for the experiment.  
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Results and Discussion 
One-factor repeated measures ANOVAs were performed on (i) median RTs to probes 
in the two match conditions, (ii) accuracy of probe identification in the two match 
conditions, and (iii) accuracy of the memory task in the two match conditions. For 
RTs, only correct trials were included in the analysis (correct in terms of both probe 
identification and memory recall – see Downing, 2000). Probe stimulus identification 
was significantly more accurate in the match vs. the mismatch condition (88% vs. 
84%; F1,17=24.53, MSE= 0.001, p<0.001), but median RTs were not significantly 
different (890ms vs. 905ms, F1,17=0.683, MSE= 3063.32). Importantly, this trend 
persisted even in the final block (93% vs. 84% accuracy, F1,17=3.51, MSE=0.023, 
p=0.07). It should be noted that 14 of the 18 participants achieved 100% accuracy in 
the final block for the match condition; only six participants achieved 100% accuracy 
in the final block in the mismatch condition.  This observation suggests limited 
statistical power that may account for the marginal level of significance. Mean 
accuracy in the memory task was 96% in both match and mismatch conditions 
(F1,17<1, MSE=0.001). 
 
It was concluded that despite the probability manipulation, to ensure that it was not 
beneficial to pay attention to the item matching that in working memory, people paid 
more attention to the memorised stimulus, relative to the novel stimulus. The effect 
reported in Downing (2000) was, therefore, unlikely to be a consciously controllable 
phenomenon; otherwise participants in the present experiment would have learnt that 
it was beneficial to divert their attention away from the matching prime stimulus and 
toward the mismatching prime stimulus. Thus, our results are concordant with those 
of Soto et al (2005) and confirm the involuntary nature of the effect. The results also 
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argue against an illusory correlation effect because the probe stimulus was actually 
correlation in the opposite direction (i.e. with the mismatching stimulus).  
 
Experiment 2 –Previous exposure vs. working memory affecting responses? 
 
A second possibility for Downing’s (2000) results is that mere exposure to a cue 
stimulus is sufficient to make it attract attention when later presented in a display; no 
memory component is required. Both Downing (2000) and Soto et al (2005) 
suggested that such a bottom-up priming effect could not account for the bias in the 
allocation of attention to remembered stimuli because no bias for previously presented 
stimuli was found when participants were not required to remember cue stimuli. 
However, in Soto et al (2005) participants had no task to perform on the cue stimulus 
so may have ignored it, but Downing (2000) found a statistically significant bias in 
the opposite direction - attention was guided away from previously presented stimuli, 
suggesting that it was not ignored totally (i.e. was involved in the suppression of 
responses in some way).  It is important to note that in the above studies the neutral 
stimuli in the displays were not given the same amount of prior exposure (i.e. they 
were not previously presented) relative to the memorised object. It could be that the 
effects of memory guidance are enhanced due to this factor. In this experiment, we 
investigated (i) whether the effects of working memory guidance vary depending on 
whether the neutral and memorised stimuli in the prime display had been given equal 
prior exposure or not, and (ii) whether there are weaker responses (i.e. inhibition) to a 
previously presented neutral stimulus not held in working memory, as suggested by 
Downing (2000). In other words, we wanted to preclude the possibility that 
differences in bottom-up visual priming of the different objects presented could 
account for the bias. In one condition, we ensured that the two stimuli in the prime 
display had received equal prior exposure, but only one had to be remembered, in the 
other condition, only one of the stimuli was presented and had to be remembered.  
 
A number of (not necessarily mutually exclusive) possibilities arose from our design: 
(i) If the differences in prior exposure between memory and probe displays (and not 
just the active maintenance in working memory) are important to bias attention, we 
would expect the bias to be enhanced under single cue vs. dual cue presentation 
conditions, because in dual cue presentation conditions both items in the prime 
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display had received equal prior exposure; (ii) If responses to previously presented 
(but “ignored”) stimuli are weakened in this paradigm, slower responses to 
mismatching probes in the dual vs. single presentation condition would be expected; 
(iii) If holding a stimulus in working memory alone causes attentional bias one would 
expect a significant and similar effect of probe match in both conditions (the fact that 
in the dual presentation condition both stimuli have previously been presented will not 
make a difference).   
 
Participants 
22 participants (1 male) volunteered from the 1st year undergraduate psychology 
students at Aston University in order to earn research credits as part of a course 
requirement as detailed in Experiment 1. The mean age of participants was 18.89 
(range:18-23). Participants were naïve to the purpose of the experiment. 
 
Design and Procedure 
The experiment was the same as Experiment 1, except that (i) participants were 
instructed to remember only the stimulus presented within a black border (from up to 
two possible stimuli presented – see example in Table 2) and (ii) the probability of the 
probe appearing on a matching or a non-matching stimulus was 50%, as in Downing’s 
(2000) original experiment. On half the trials, a single cue stimulus in a black box was 
presented towards the top of the display, on the other half of the trials, an additional 
neutral stimulus was presented in the centre of the screen (in an attempt to encourage 
equality of attention across the two stimuli). When two stimuli were presented in the 
cue display, the stimuli in the subsequent prime display were the same two stimuli, so 
that in theory each prime stimulus had received comparable prior exposure. In 
addition, the memory stimulus presented at the end of each trial could either be 
completely novel (25% of time), the distractor stimulus from the cue and prime 
displays (25% of time), or the cue stimulus (50% of time). Participants practiced for 
10 trials and then completed 12 blocks of 10 experimental trials.  
 
Results and Discussion 
One participant was removed from the analyses due to mean probe identification 
accuracy of only 56% (chance performance = 50%). Median RTs were included only 
for those trials in which both the probe and the memory test were both accurately 
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identified (as above). Mean median RTs and percentage accuracy in the different 
conditions are presented in Table 1.  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
A two factor ANOVA examining the effects of procedure (single or dual cue stimulus 
display presented) and probe match condition was conducted on median RTs to the 
probe. There was a significant effect of probe match (F1,20=6.96, MSE= 4079.08, 
p<0.05), but no main effect of procedure (F1,20=2.88, MSE= 4658.68, p=0.11). The 
interaction between these two variables did not reach significance (F1,20=1.25, MSE= 
6252.95).  
 
For the accuracy data, there was a highly significant effect of match (F1,20=19.82, 
MSE= 0.008, p<0.001), but no main effect of procedure (F1,20=0.35, MSE= 0.007). 
The interaction between these two variables did not reach significance (F1,20=1.14, 
MSE= 0.005).  
 
For the memory test, accuracy to match vs. mismatch conditions were compared, but 
there was no significant effect (F1,21=1.03, MSE=0.002). Results of post-hoc t tests 
investigating differences between all of the possible conditions are shown in Table 1. 
It can be seen that there were significant effects of probe match in both single and 
dual presentation conditions for accuracy, but that probe match only had a significant 
effect on reaction time in single presentation conditions. There were no significant 
differences in reaction time or accuracy between single vs. dual presentation 
conditions. 
 
When both stimuli were presented in the cue display as well as in the prime and 
prime-probe displays, our results suggested that attention was still more likely to be 
directed to the stimulus in working memory. However, this was only significant for 
accuracy (and not RT) in dual presentation conditions. The lack of a significant 
interaction between procedure and probe match for either RT or accuracy suggested 
that neither bottom-up priming nor response weakening effects were adequate 
explanations of the effect and that the best explanation of the effect was working 
memory alone. 
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There was no evidence that previously presented objects received weaker responses. 
The only clear result was that stimuli in working memory attracted attention over 
stimuli that were not, even if they had been given equal prior exposure. However, one 
problem with the interpretation of these results is the difficulty of obtaining adequate 
control over possible bottom-up priming effects. Thus, although a response 
weakening explanation has been satisfactorily ruled out, the possibility that different 
amounts of priming were crucial for the effect has not been ruled out. For example, in 
the dual presentation condition, it remains a possibility that the two stimuli were 
differentially primed because more attention was given to the stimulus that had to be 
remembered. Thus, Experiment 3 attempted to address the difficulty of dissociating 
working memory and bottom-up priming effects under conditions where the memory 
and non-memory stimuli have initially been given equal attentional allocation and 
under conditions where memorised stimuli have not always been primed in a bottom-
up manner. In order to do this, we required observers to hold in working memory a 
conceptual representation of a number in working memory without actually 
presenting it, and conversely by encouraging attention to pictorial stimuli, without 
actually requiring participants to remember them.  
 
Experiment 3 – Dissociating effects of bottom-up priming and memory 
Experiment 3 attempted to dissociate the two processes of working memory and 
bottom-up priming by asking people to pay attention to particular stimuli in the cue 
array by counting them (thereby priming the stimuli), but to remember only the 
number of stimuli presented rather than their identity. Either a competing (neutral) or 
a concordant numeral was also presented in the array. It was ensured that participants 
paid attention to (and therefore primed) both the numeral presented and the stimuli in 
the array by asking them to indicate whether they were in agreement with each other. 
Thus, particular pictorial stimuli were visually primed, but not held in memory, 
whereas numerical stimuli were either visually primed and held in memory, or simply 
held in memory (if a competing number was presented).  
 
In order to investigate the effects of working memory vs. bottom-up priming on the 
guidance of attention, we then presented various combinations of numerical and 
pictorial prime stimuli. These included contrasting the remembered number with a 
novel number, the remembered number with the neutral (incorrect) number presented 
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in the initial array, and a novel number with the neutral number. The possibility of 
negative priming (e.g. Tipper, 1985) should also be noted in this experiment, since 
competing numerals may have to be rejected or suppressed. 
 
In order to further investigate whether bottom-up priming of a stimulus could be 
sufficient to affect the deployment of attention under certain circumstances, we also 
investigated whether the picture that had been presented would still attract attention 
compared to a novel picture under two conditions: when the numeral presented and 
the number to be remembered agreed vs. disagreed. 
 
We reasoned that: 
i) If bottom-up visual priming was sufficient (memory not necessary) for a 
remembered stimulus to attract attention, probes on previously presented 
numbers and pictures would be responded to faster regardless of whether 
they were remembered or not. 
ii) If bottom-up visual priming was necessary but not sufficient to attract 
attention, probes on previously presented numbers and pictures would only 
be responded to faster if they also had to be remembered and, conversely, 
remembered numbers would only be responded to faster if they had also 
been presented previously. 
iii) If memory alone is sufficient for a stimulus to attract attention (bottom-up 
visual priming is not necessary), remembered numerals would attract 
attention regardless of whether they had been presented previously. 
Whether or not previously presented pictures attract attention would 
depend on whether or not bottom-up visual priming was also sufficient on 
its own to attract attention (see option i).  
 
Participants 
36 first year undergraduate psychology students (3 males) at Aston University 
volunteered to participate in this experiment in return for research credits. The ages 
ranged from 18-38 years, but the majority of participants were either 18 or 19 years 
old. The mean age was 19.51 years. Participants were naïve as to the purpose of the 
experiment.  
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Design and Procedure 
The experiment was programmed using E prime v1.1. On each trial, a display was 
presented (until response) that contained a numeral between one and six, and between 
one and six identical photos (see Figure 2).  Participants had to decide whether or not 
the numeral agreed with the number of pictures in the array by pressing the ‘c’ and ‘v’ 
keys marked ‘yes’ and ‘no’ respectively; no time limit was imposed. Half of the time 
the numbers agreed (PRIMED condition), half of the time they did not; i.e. the 
number was ‘neutral’ (NON-PRIMED condition). From this display, participants were 
also asked to remember the number of pictures in the array (analogous to the cue 
stimulus in Experiments 1 and 2). A fixation point was then presented (700 ms) before 
a display containing two prime stimuli to the left and to the right of the fixation point 
(187 ms). The two prime stimuli presented in the array could be either pictures or 
numerals (the STIMULUS TYPE factor), but a mixture of pictures and numerals was 
never presented. This was because pilot work had suggested that responses to probes 
could not satisfactorily be compared across pictures and numerals due to differences 
in both RT and accuracy for these stimuli. The same display was then re-displayed 
containing a “u” or “n” shaped probe (50:50 ratio) superimposed on the centre of one 
of the stimuli (50:50 ratio) until response. Participants had to respond as quickly and 
as accurately as possible whether the probe was a “u” or an “n” by pressing the “k” 
and “m” keys, respectively. Which stimulus the probe fell on constituted the factor of 
MATCH (match/mismatch; see results section for further details). Following response 
to the probe, a final screen displayed a memory stimulus in the form of a single 
numeral. Half the time this numeral was the number that the participant should have 
been remembering, the other half of the time it was not. Participants indicated which 
by pressing the yes or no keys as above; no time limit was imposed for this decision.  
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The various experimental conditions are illustrated with examples in Table 2, which 
also shows results of post hoc t-tests. If the initial numeral had agreed with the 
number of objects presented in the display (PRIMED NUMBER: 50% of time), 
pictures occurred 50% of the time with the primed picture on one side and a novel 
picture on the other side. The other 50% of the time the numeral presented (and to be 
remembered) was presented on one side of the display, with a novel numeral on the 
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other side of the display. If the numeral presented and the number of pictures had not 
agreed (NON-PRIMED NUMBER: 50% of time), the pictures (one primed and one 
novel) occurred only 25% of the time. The other three equally weighted conditions 
(25% of the time each) contained (i) a novel numeral and the neutral numeral that had 
been presented in the first display, (ii) a novel numeral (neither previously presented 
or to be remembered) and the number to be remembered (i.e. the numeral 
corresponding to the number of pictures in the array) – as shown in Figure 2 - and (iii) 
the numeral to be remembered and the neutral numeral as presented in the first 
display.  
 
Results and Discussion 
As before, for RT analyses only RTs of trials in which responses to both the probe and 
the memory test were correct were analysed. Firstly, a three factor ANOVA was 
conducted investigating the effects on median RTs to probes. The effects of interest 
were whether or not the number to be remembered had also been previously presented 
(PRIMED/NON-PRIMED NUMBER), whether pictures or numerals were presented 
in the display (STIMULUS TYPE) and whether the probe fell on the “matching” item 
or not (MATCH). Matching was defined when the probe was on either the number to 
be remembered, or the pictures that had been displayed, as opposed to either the 
neutral or novel numerals and the neutral pictures This analysis did not, therefore, 
encompass all of the conditions in the experiment, but was suitable for an initial 
analysis in order to preclude problems of multiple comparisons with limited cell 
membership (observations) and allow for investigations of main effects1.  
 
The main effect of PRIMED/NON-PRIMED NUMBER was not significant 
(F1,35=1.96, MSE=4389.50), suggesting that the format of the initial display had no 
significant main effect on reaction times to subsequent probes. Effects of both 
STIMULUS TYPE and MATCH were significant (F1,35= 18.26, MSE= 10332.14, 
                                                 
1
 The ‘number vs. novel’ conditions were used to represent the numerical stimuli in 
this analysis since these data were available for both levels of the PRIMED/NON-
PRIMED NUMBER factor (e.g. no observations in the PRIMED number vs. neutral 
number condition cell).  
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p<0.001 and F1,35=6.59, MSE=9943.33, p<0.05) showing that, overall, probes on 
numerals were responded to faster than probes on pictures and that, as expected, 
probes on matching stimuli were responded to faster than probes on non-matching 
stimuli. There was also a significant PRIMED/NON-PRIMED NUMBER x 
STIMULUS TYPE interaction (F1,35=4.74, MSE= 1732.66, p<0.05), showing that 
whereas for responses to probes on the pictures it did not make a difference whether 
or not the remembered number had been presented in the first display, for the 
numbers, probes were responded to faster if they had been presented. However, there 
was also a significant three way interaction (F1,35=6.76, MSE= 2892.94, p<0.05), 
suggesting that when remembered numbers had not been presented the effect of 
MATCH was similar for both stimulus types, whereas when the remembered number 
had been presented, the effect of MATCH was greatest for the numerals. 
 
In order to simplify the analyses, and due to the three way interaction found, a series 
of t-tests was conducted to examine the effects of MATCH across various pairings of 
stimuli. The results of these tests are detailed below, but also illustrated more 
succinctly in Table 2.  
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Firstly, in the conditions in which the remembered number was presented, the effect 
of MATCH was significant for the comparison between the numeral presented (and 
remembered) and a novel numeral (874 vs. 909ms, t(35)=3.54, p<0.005). This 
replicates the basic effect that stimuli in working memory attract attention, at least 
when bottom-up priming is present. However, there was also a strong trend towards 
an effect of MATCH for the comparison between the picture presented and a novel 
picture (928 vs. 979ms, t(35)=2.01, p=0.052). This suggests that bottom-up priming 
effects are sufficient to affect the deployment of attention. 
 
In the conditions in which the remembered numeral was not presented, the effect of 
MATCH was again significant for the comparison between the numeral to be 
remembered and a novel numeral (892 vs. 934ms, t(35)= 2.46, p<0.05) and the neutral 
numeral (939 vs. 873ms, t(35)= 3.92, p<0.001). Faster responses to probes were given 
on the number to be remembered, even though it had not previously been visually 
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presented, showing that bottom up visual priming is not necessary for the effect 
reported by Downing (2000) to occur and that working memory alone is sufficient. 
Interestingly, the differences in latency between number vs. neutral was greater than 
that between number vs. novel, suggesting that bottom-up priming effects are at the 
very least ‘over-ridden’ by working memory effects2.  
 
In terms of the accuracy data, there were no significant differences between any of the 
conditions, although in the equivalent 3 factor ANOVA to that performed for the RTs, 
there was a trend towards significance (F1,35 = 3.49, MSE= 0.00, p=0.07). This 
suggested that the effect of MATCH was larger for pictures than numbers when the 
number to be remembered had been presented, whereas the opposite was true when 
the number to be remembered had not been presented. None of the post-hoc 
comparisons reached significance.  
 
Overall, the data from this experiment suggested that bottom-up visual priming (i) 
may be sufficient to attract attention, but (ii) is not necessary  - memory alone is 
sufficient. The first conclusion, however, needs to be qualified. Although a trend 
towards an effect of MATCH (p=0.052) was found in the condition where the number 
was primed, no such pattern was observed in the condition where the number was not 
primed. A two factor ANOVA investigating the effects of PRIMED/ NON-PRIMED 
NUMBER and MATCH on median RTs to probes on pictures found no main effect of 
MATCH (F1,35 = 0.001, MSE= 3689.41), no main effect of PRIMED/ NON-PRIMED 
(F1,35 =1.66, MSE=10667.86), but a significant interaction between the two factors 
(F1,35 = 6.50, MSE=4748.51, p<0.05). The disappearance of any effect of probe match 
to the picture stimuli in the condition in which there was no agreement between the 
number of pictures in the array and the numeral presented suggests that the previous 
presentation of the pictures was not enough to attract attention in the subsequent array 
under these conditions. However, equally, the fact that there was a strong trend 
towards an effect of probe match in the condition in which there was agreement 
between the number of pictures and the numeral presented, suggests that priming can 
                                                 
2
 Negative priming of the novel numeral is one possibility of the increased effect, but 
the explanation seems unlikely since neither the neutral vs. novel condition (899 vs. 
908ms, t(35)=-0.685, n.s.) nor the picture vs. novel picture conditions (957 vs. 950ms, 
t(35)= -0.50,  n.s.) showed a significant difference in either direction. However, both 
differences were in the expected direction for a negative priming effect. 
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result in such effects. We speculate that attention may be directed away from the 
number in the display when it is not the correct one to remember. This would lead to 
the presence of inhibitory processes which could well reduce any effects of bottom-up 
priming. In contrast, when the number of pictures and the number match, the display 
does not have to be inhibited in any way and a bottom-up priming effect may emerge 
in this case. Further research will be required to fully elucidate why these difference 
have occurred. 
 
For now, we may conclude that stimuli held in working memory do seem to attract 
attention and that priming is not necessary (but may be sufficient) for this process to 
occur. It is interesting to note, that the effects of holding a stimulus in working 
memory and of bottom-up visual priming do not appear to be additive. Although this 
experiment was not specifically designed to test this hypothesis, post-hoc analyses 
suggested no significant differences between the speeds of responses to probes on 
remembered numerals in any of the three relevant conditions. 
 
Experiments 4 and 5 – Controlling for strategy effects 
Experiments 1 and 2 were close adaptations of Downing’s (2000) methodology in that 
the probe appeared for 146ms before disappearing. However, in Experiment 3, pilot 
studies suggested that participants needed longer to detect the probe accurately, and so 
the probe was presented until a response was made. Downing (2000) reported effects 
for both reaction time and accuracy. In Experiments 1 and 2 we found effects mainly 
on accuracy, whereas in Experiment 3 our effects were only on reaction time. The 
inconsistency in methodology between the experiments seems a likely cause of the 
discrepant locus of effects. However, an alternative view is that it could indicate 
differential strategies by the participants (i.e. speed – accuracy trade-off). Downing 
(2000) emphasised effects of reaction rather than accuracy. In Experiments 4 and 5 
we investigated whether we could replicate the results of Experiments 1 and 2, but, by 




The design and procedure of Experiments 4 and 5 were identical to those of 
Experiments 1 and 2 respectively, with the following caveats. In both experiments the 
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probe was presented until a response was made. In Experiment 5, the cue stimulus 
could be presented either towards to top (50% probability) or the bottom (50% 
probability) of the display.  The latter was a further attempt to ensure that both cue 
objects were viewed.  
 
Participants 
14 first year undergraduate psychology students (all female) at Aston University 
volunteered to participate in Experiment 4 in return for research credits. The ages 
ranged from 18-47 years, but the majority of participants were either 18 or 19 years 
old. The mean age was 21.93 years. 16 first year undergraduate psychology students 
(1 male) at Aston University volunteered to participate in Experiment 5 in return for 
research credits. The ages ranged from 18-33 years, but the majority of participants 
were either 18 or 19 years old. The mean age was 19.75 years. Participants were naïve 
as to the purpose of the experiment.  
 
Results and Discussion 
The results of Experiment 4 were analysed as in Experiment 1. One-factor repeated 
measures ANOVAs were performed on (i) median RTs to probes in the two match 
conditions (ii) accuracy to probes in the two match conditions and (iii) accuracy to the 
memory task in the two match conditions. For RTs, only correct trials were included 
in the analysis (accurate identification of probe and memory performance – see 
Downing, 2000). Despite extremely high accuracy levels, accuracy was significantly 
higher in the match vs. the mismatch condition (100% vs. 99%, F1,13=7.58, 
MSE<0.01, p<0.05). Median RTs were also significantly different (756ms vs. 806ms, 
F1,13=27.25, MSE= 636.80) with faster performance in match conditions. In the final 
block, all participants’ accuracy was 100%, but there remained a significant effect on 
reaction time (F1,13=5.41, MSE=7254.74, p<0.05) with faster performance in match 
conditions. Mean accuracy in the memory task was 98% in both match and mismatch 
conditions (F<1). 
 
The results of Experiment 5 were analysed as in Experiment 2. One participant was 
excluded on the grounds of poor performance in the memory task (62% correct). A 
two factor ANOVA examining the effects of procedure (single or dual objects 
presented) and probe match condition was conducted on median RTs to the probe. 
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There was a significant effect of probe match (F1,14=27.82, MSE= 4891.10, 
p<0.0001), but no main effect of procedure (F1,14=1.34, MSE= 2727.32). The 
interaction between these two variables did not reach significance (F<1). For the 
accuracy data, there were no significant effects or interactions (all F’s<1). For the 
memory test, accuracy to match vs. mismatch conditions were compared, but there 
was no significant effect (F1,14=3.41, MSE=0.001, p=0.098), but a trend towards a 
higher performance in match conditions (96% vs. 94%).  
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Results of post-hoc t tests investigating differences between all of the possible 
conditions are shown in Table 3. It can be seen that there were significant effects of 
probe match in both single and dual presentation conditions for reaction time, but that 
there were no significant effects on accuracy. There were no significant differences in 
reaction time or accuracy between single vs. dual presentation conditions. 
 
Together, the results of Experiments 4 and 5 provide reassurance that the original 
inconsistency between Experiments 1 and 2, and Experiment 3 is unlikely to be due to 
strategy effects. Rather, whether the effects are exhibited in terms of reaction time or 
accuracy is more likely related to the presentation method of the stimuli, which was 
initially different across the experiments. 
 
General Discussion 
The results from the experiments presented here therefore show that attention is 
drawn towards stimuli held in working memory, even when they have not previously 
been presented (Experiment 3) and when there is no strategic benefit in doing so 
(Experiments 2 and 4). Thus, we offer further support for the biased competition 
model of attention (Desimone and Duncan, 1995), which has suggested that top-down 
control signals arising from working memory can guide attention. In Experiment 3 we 
showed that working memory could influence selection in a purely top-down manner. 
In addition, and in contrast with previous studies, we have found some preliminary 
evidence to suggest that, under certain conditions, bottom-up priming may also be 
able to guide attention. 
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The modular architecture of working memory (Baddeley, 1999) presents a number of 
possible sources of influence on the allocation of attention. Traditionally, working 
memory effects are thought to represent the influence of visual working memory; 
however, it may be that participants verbalise stimuli that they have been asked to 
remember and that verbal, rather than visual working memory is therefore the 
mediating mechanism. Further research would be required to distinguish between the 
two possibilities. Potter (1975) suggested that observers recognised target pictures in 
rapid serial visual presentation streams as accurately and “almost as rapidly” (p.965) 
when only the name of the picture was presented vs. when the picture itself was 
presented. Cooper (1974) showed that the content of spoken language could influence 
eye movements, participants fixating the referents of the words being heard. Huettig 
and Altman (2005) showed that this also applied to referents semantically related to 
those being heard. Thus, in Experiment 3 in particular, it could be considered 
relatively unsurprising that stimuli that have not been presented visually, but probably 
have been internally verbalised in working memory, attract attention. The experiments 
presented here were not designed to tease out verbal vs. visual working memory 
effects. Rather, we aimed to show that bottom-up priming is not necessary for such 
effects to occur and that top-down selection is sufficient. 
 
Although some caution needs to be exercised in interpreting our marginal effect 
suggesting that bottom-up priming can have effects on attention, we could speculate 
why our results hint towards this, whereas no such effect was found in Soto et al 
(2005). One possible reason is because the stimuli may not have been sufficiently 
primed in Soto et al (2005) since participants did not have a task to perform on them, 
stimuli were ignored with no further consequences for performance. Second, Soto et 
al (2005) used a visual search tasks where the memory and search target stimuli were 
presented simultaneously. Under these conditions, the presence of the search target 
may have ‘won the competition’ against the basic bottom-up priming effect 
originating from the prior presentation of the memory cue (see also Moores, Laiti and 
Chelazzi, 2003). Further, in Soto et al (2006) memory effects were observed with a 
‘pop-out’ search target which in itself captured attention automatically. Under these 
conditions, bottom-up priming effects may be less noticeable. In our study, there were 
no competing stimuli presented with the target, since the prime display was presented 
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before the probe. This could have facilitated the manifestation of bottom-up priming 
effects in our study.  
 
We found no evidence to support the argument made by Downing (2000) that 
responses made to previously exposed stimuli are subsequently weakened if they are 
not remembered. In Experiments 2 and 5 there was no interaction between condition 
(one object vs. two objects) and probe match; in both conditions a more or less equal 
increase of either speed or accuracy was found when the probe appeared on the object 
matching that in working memory. Furthermore, in Experiment 3 a marginal effect of 
prior exposure occurred only when the numbers were bottom-up primed and not when 
the initial display effectively had to be inhibited. As noted above, Soto et al (2005) 
found no effect at all of prior exposure or priming. Further research may be able to 
elucidate the reason why different procedures seem to result in different effects.  
 
In conclusion, our results provide support for the view that stimuli held in working 
memory guide attention in a largely involuntary fashion. In addition, we show that 
stimuli do not have to have been shown previously for the guidance to take place, but 
instead that conceptual representations retrieved from long-term memory can be 
sufficient. Furthermore, we provide preliminary evidence that previous exposure or 
priming can result in similar effects under some circumstances, although further 
research will be required to elucidate the full nature of this effect.  
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Figure 2. Display Procedure for Experiment 3 . In this example, the number to be remembered is three (because there are three stimuli shown), 
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Table 1. Median RTs and percent accuracy in the different conditions of Experiment 2. 
 One object present 
 





One vs. two object 
significance 
Probe match RT 







Probe mismatch RT 
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• p values are for paired t-tests testing match vs. mismatch in the conditions concerned 
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Table 3. Median RTs and percent accuracy in the different conditions in Experiment 5. 
 One object present 
 





One vs. two object 
significance 
Probe match RT 







Probe mismatch RT 
Probe mismatch Accuracy 
856ms 
98% 
839ms 
99% 
n.s. 
n.s. 
Significance RT 
Significance Accuracy 
p<0.0001 
n.s  
p<0.001 
n.s 
 
 
 
